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COMMENT
Sosa v. MN Lago Izabal: A Foreign
Seaman's Right to American Law
On January 21, 1980, a fire erupted aboard the vessel MN
Lago Izabal while it was attempting to dock at Adams Terminal in
Houston, Texas.1 Gonzalo Sosa, a Mexican seaman who was
trapped inside the engine room where the fire had begun, sus-
tained burns over eighty percent of his body.2 Sosa had contracted
for his employment in Mexico. Although a Cayman Island corpora-
tion owned the vessel, U.S. citizens held over ninety percent of the
corporation's stock.3 In addition, the vessel conducted most of its
operations out of Houston, Texas.4
Sosa filed suit against his employer and its vessel in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
alleging that the vessel was in an unseaworthy condition. The dis-
trict court entered judgment for Sosa, holding that the vessel's un-
seaworthiness was the proximate cause of his damages.5 The ship-
owner appealed, contending, inter alia, that the district court
erred in finding that both the place of the wrong and the base of
the ship's operations were in the United States.6 He argued the
court should have dismissed Sosa's claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held, affirmed: the lower court had correctly ap-
plied American law to plaintiff's claim for unseaworthiness, where
(1) the United States was both the place of the wrongful act and
the base of operations for the vessel,8 and (2) U.S. citizens owned
over ninety percent of the shipowner's corporate stock.9 Sosa v. M1
1. Sosa v. MV Lago Izabal, 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1030.
3. Id. at 1032.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1030.
6. Id. at 1031.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1032.
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V Laga Izabal, 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
This Note will examine whether a U.S. district court may af-
ford a foreign seaman the powerful remedies available under
American maritime law, where his only contact with the United
States is that his vessel conducted its day-to-day operating activi-
ties in the United States. The disposition of this issue has a serious
economic impact on foreign vessel owners. By affording foreign
seamen such powerful remedies, courts substantially increase the
vessel owner's cost of operation. Applying American law, however,
ensures that foreign shipowners who engage in active trade to or
from American ports will not be at a competitive advantage vis-a-
vis American shipowners who have to operate under the signifi-
cantly higher costs imposed by American law.
The Sosa court applied an eight factor choice-of-law test in
reaching its decision. 10 The factors the Sosa court considered are:
(1) place of the wrong (lex loci deliciti commissi); (2) law of the
flag; (3) domicile of the injured seaman; (4) allegiance of ship-
owner; (5) place of contract; (6) accessibility of foreign forum; (7)
law of the forum; and (8) base of operations.
Place of the wrong is the traditional test for deciding a choice-
of-law issue in tort actions.1 This test, however, has limited appli-
cation to cases in maritime tort, because of the varieties of legal
authority that exist over international waters. The doctrine has a
territorial effect which cannot easily be applied to vessels that
often travel through several jurisdictions in a single voyage. 2
The law of the flag has long been recognized as the universal
rule for determining which law to apply. Each country determines
the conditions for granting its flag to a ship, thereby accepting re-
sponsibility for what transpires on the ship.1" In Wildenhus' Case"4
a Belgian seaman from a Belgian ship was held in an American
prison for a crime he had committed while aboard his vessel while
in U.S. territorial waters. The Supreme Court, applied the law of
10. A seven-factor test originated in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The
eighth factor, base of operations, was later added in Hellenic Lines Limited v. Rhoditis, 398
U.S. 306 (1970).
11. See, e.g., New York Central Railroad Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925); Slater v.
Mexican Nat'l. Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
12. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953).
13. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 15 L.Ed. 595
(1857).
14. 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
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the flag test, and held that all matters occurring on board and af-
fecting only the vessel should be left to the vessel's government.
The Wildenhus doctrine has been expanded to cover events which
affect the peace and tranquility of the port of call. The fiction that
a vessel belongs to the nation of its flag,15 remains a strong factor
and supercedes the place of the wrong in determining choice-of-
law. 1
Under both the allegiance or domicile of the injured test, the
nationality of a vessel, for jurisdictional purposes, is given to her
crew, regardless of their national origins. 17 In re Ross"5 involved a
British seaman, who, while employed on an American vessel, was
given the status of an American citizen. The Court held that
"[w]hen a foreigner enters the mercantile marine of a nation, and
becomes one of the crew of a merchant vessel bearing its flag, he
assumes a temporary allegiance to the flag, and, in return for the
protection afforded him, becomes subject to the laws by which that
nation governs its vessels and seamen." The doctrine is premised
on the strong policy consideration that the United States has a
duty to protect foreign seamen from wrongful injury incurred while
in the service of vessels registered in the United States.1 9 This fac-
tor generally carries little weight unless it conflicts with the closely
related factors of law of the flag and allegiance of the shipowner.
In Sosa, such a conflict does exist because the seaman was domi-
ciled in the United States and the vessel was of foreign registry.
Therefore, the factor may have played a greater role.
It is seldom necessary to look to the nationality of the ship-
owner, because it is usually the same as the ship's flag.20 During
the past century in the United States, however, the allegiance of
the defendant shipowner is not so easily determinable, because of
attempts by U.S. shipowners to use "flags of convenience" to avoid
stringent U.S. shipping labor and social welfare laws by registering
under a foreign flag.2 1 The courts of the United States have a legit-
15. See A. HIGGINS & C. CALOMM0S, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 288-293 (6th ed.
1967).
16. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584.
17. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 472 (1891).
18. Id. at 453.
19. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 586.
20. It is a statutory requirement that a U.S. registered vessel be either wholly or
predominantly owned by a U.S. citizen. 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1982).
21. See W. McFEE, THE LAW OF THE SEA, 152-154 (1951); see also Merchant Marine
Study and Investigation (Transfer of American Ships to Foreign Registry). Hearings before
the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, S. Doc. No. 6857, 81st Cong., 1st
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imate interest in applying powerful American remedies against
predominantly American shipowners, who seek to evade U.S. law.
The place of contract is a significant factor in choice-of-law
questions raised in contract cases. Looking to the place of contract
is usually fortuitous, because it is believed that "[a] seaman takes
his employment, like his fun, where he finds it; a ship takes on
crew in any port where it needs them."22 Seamen's claims under
the Jones Act,23 which provides a statutory right of action in per-
sonal injury claims, and the unseaworthiness doctrine,24 however,
Sess.(1949). Congress attempted to resolve this problem by simplifying and clarifying the
laws relating to vessel documentation. See VESSEL DOCUMENTATION ACT, U.S. CODE CON-
GRESSIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, 96th Cong., 2nd Session, 7162 (1980). Congress hoped
that the Act would "facilitate trade and commerce by classifying vessels for regulation,
safety, pilotage, fee assessment, and taxation purposes. Id. at 7165.
22. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588.
23. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). The Act reads, in its entirety, as follows:
§ 688. REcOVERY FOR INJURY TO OR DEATH OF SEAMAN
(a) Application of railway employee statutes; jurisdiction
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death
of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such
seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for
death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall
be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his
principal office is located.
(b) Limitation for certain aliens; applicability in lieu of other remedy
(1) No action may be maintained under subsection (a) of this section or under any
other maritime law of the United States for maintenance and care for damages for the in-
jury or death of a person who was not a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United
States at the time of the incident giving rise to the action if the incident occurred
(A) while that person was in the employ of an enterprise engaged in the exploration,
development, or production of off-shore mineral or energy resources-including but not lim-
ited to drilling, mapping, surveying, diving, pipelaying, maintaining, repairing, constructing,
or transporting supplies, equipment, or personnel, but not including transporting those re-
sources by (a) vessel constructed or adapted primarily to carry oil in bulk in the cargo
spaces; and
(B) in the territorial waters or waters overlaying the continental shelf of a nation other
than the United States, its territories, or possessions. As used in this paragraph, the term
"continental shelf" has the meaning stated in Article I of the 1958 Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable if the
person bringing the action establishes that no remedy was available to that person
(A) under the laws of the nation asserting jurisdiction over the area in which the inci-
dent occurred, or
(B) under the laws of the nation in which, at the time of the incident, the person for
whose injury or death a remedy is sought maintained citizenship or residency.
24. This discussion is limited to those claims that a seaman may bring against his em-
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sound in tort. Thus, the factor has little application in such
actions.2 5
Inaccessibility of foreign forum becomes relevant where jus-
tice requires the adjudication of a seaman's claim in an American
court in order to save him the time and expense of returning to a
foreign forum. This factor, however, is not pertinent to the con-
flicts-of-law issue of this note. Although it may be valuable in de-
termining which court hears the case, it does not assist in deter-
mining what law is to be applied.
It may be unreasonable to apply the law of the forum on the
grounds that defendant has slight contacts with the forum, even
though a court has perfected jurisdiction over the parties. The doc-
trine of forum non converiens contemplates the discretionary dec-
lination of jurisdiction where pursuing the action in the forum
would be "unduly vexatious or burdensome to the defendant."2 6 In
Sosa, the court was able to obtain jurisdiction over the shipper,
because the company had maintained certain minimum contacts
with the particular forum. One question that may arise in similar
factual contexts is whether the minimum contact of "doing busi-
ness" in the United States warrants the application of American
law. In Sosa, the tort involved was arguably of a local nature. Ad-
ditional contacts, such as the existence of American stockholders,
helped tie the case to American law. When a case is tried in a par-
ticular forum, procedure does not require that the law of that fo-
rum be applied. To do so would be to undermine the very purpose
of the conflict-of-laws doctrine; namely, to ensure that every case
be treated in the same way with the appropriate law applied.27
The base of operations factor was first applied in Hellenic
Lines Limited v. Rhoditis,2 and gradually has become the major,
if not deciding, factor in choice-of-law cases. 29 This factor is pre-
mised on strong policy considerations that require foreign ship-
ployer for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness.
25. Even though a seaman's claim for unseaworthiness is created out of the fiction that
he has impliedly contracted with the shipowner for a "seaworthy" vessel, principles of tort
are looked to when assessing shipowner's liability. E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, §
23 at 51-58 (7th ed. 1984).
26. Mowrey v. Johnson & Johnson, 524 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D. Penn. 1981).
27. Id. at 591.
28. 398 U.S. 306 (1970). While the factor appears as dictum in Lauritzen, it was only
first incorporated as part of the test in Rhoditis.




owners to carry the same obligations and responsibilities as U.S.
employers/shipowners if they conduct a majority of their business
in the United States. A foreign shipper should not be allowed to
reap profits from business in the United States, yet escape the
costs that U.S. shippers must assume for engaging in extensive
business operations in the United States.30 To do otherwise would
be to give foreign shippers a substantial competitive edge over
their American counterparts.
The conflicting ownership/registration dilemma was precisely
the situation with which the Sosa court had to contend. The de-
fendant vessel was registered to a foreign corporation, but owned
almost entirely by U.S. citizens. Moreover, the vessel had a base of
operations in Houston, Texas, which was also where the injury oc-
curred. The court had no doubt that these particular vessel owners
should be burdened with the same protections extended to injured
seamen of U.S. registered vessels.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MARITIME CHOICE-OF-LAW "PROBLEM"
Congress empowered the U.S. district courts with original ju-
risdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdic-
tion."31 This sweeping language indicates that the federal courts
have broad authority to adjudicate all cases in admiralty, even
when such cases may involve the rights of foreign nationals.
Whether the involvement of foreign seamen in admiralty suits has
the effect of limiting this grant of admiralty jurisdiction has long
been an issue before the federal courts.32 The courts have a history
of vacillating between a policy of promoting the liberal powers of
American admiralty remedies on the one hand, and of deferring to
the laws of foreign sovereigns on the other. This choice-of-law issue
can be divided into two categories: (1) those cases where the
choice-of-law question is resolved unilaterally by a statute which
declares American law applicable, and (2) those cases where the
choice-of-law problem is left for judicial determination.
This comment analyzes the jurisdictional development of the
latter category, whereby choice-of-law is determined by judicial
fiat. The Jones Act, a maritime law statute mandating a cause of
30. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 310.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
32. See generally Robol, Admiralty's Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Alien Defen-
dants: A Functional Analysis, 11 J. MA& L. & CoM. 395, 402-406 (1980).
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action for injured seamen, fails to expressly define its transnational
reach.33 In Lauritzen v. Larsen,4 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
a seven factor choice-of-law test 35 thereby limiting the application
of the Jones Act in actions brought by foreign seamen. In Laurit-
zen, a Danish seaman sought damages for injuries he suffered
while on board a Danish-owned vessel sailing in Cuban territorial
waters. The seaman's only connection with the United States was
that his employment contract was signed and executed in the
United States. The contract, however, was written in Danish and
stipulated the application of Danish law. 6 The Supreme Court
held the Jones Act inapplicable to the Danish seaman's cause of
action. The Court noted that it was barred, under the comity of
nations doctrine, from exercising jurisdiction over "matters of dis-
cipline, and all things done on board, which affected only the ves-
sel."' 37 The Court further noted that this limitation would persist
absent explicit congressional intent behind the language of the
Jones Act.38 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, stated that
the judiciary attempted "to avoid or resolve conflicts between com-
peting laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between
the transaction and the states or governments whose competing
laws are involved."39 He then proceeded to list and weigh the seven
choice-of-law factors affecting maritime tort claims. Of the seven
factors, Jackson stated that the law of the flag remained "the most
venerable and universal" maritime choice-of-law rule.40 Although
Jackson noted that the place of the wrong traditionally governed
the law to be applied in tort actions, he recognized that the mobil-
ity of vessels and the international character of their commerce
warranted making the law of the flag, rather than, place of the
wrong, the stronger factor.41
Jackson listed only two factors that could supercede the pre-
sumptive reference to the law of the flag: the allegiance or domi-
cile of the injured seaman and the allegiance of the defendant
shipowner.42 The other factors were considered relatively unimpor-
33. See supra note 22 for the Jones Act in its entirety.
34. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
35. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
36. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588.
37. Id. at 585, (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Wellon, 362 U.S. 100, 123 (1923)).
38. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578, 585-86.
39. Id. at 582.
40. Id. at 584.
41. Id. at 583-84.
42. Id. at 586-87. For more information on the subject, see generally Comment, A New
1985]
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tant when determining the applicability of the Jones Act.4" In Lau-
ritzen, the three primary factors, law of the flag, allegiance of the
injured seaman, and allegiance of the shipowner, supported the
application of Danish law. The seaman's only contact with the
United States was his signing of an employment contract in the
United States, a factor that the court discounted as insignificant in
tort actions.44 Consequently, the Court held that choice-of-law
principles barred application of the Jones Act to the seaman's
claim.
II. APPLICATION OF THE LAURITZEN TEST TO GENERAL MARITIME
CLAIMS
The Lauritzen Court neglected to indicate the proper judicial
recourse when choice-of-law principles barred the application of a
U.S. statute to a foreign seaman's claim.45 This omission created a
technical controversy that has frequently been at issue in similar
cases. Some courts have taken the view that if a foreign seaman is
barred from relying on the Jones Act for recovery, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.46 A more popular view
advanced by the courts in recent jurisprudence has been to employ
forum non conveniens in both Jones Act and general maritime
claims when application of the Lauritzen factors bars recovery
under American law.47
In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,48 the Su-
preme Court applied the Lauritzen test to both the general mari-
time claim, and the Jones Act claims. The Romero opinion defined
the effect of a dismissal on a seaman's remedy in an alternative
forum. In Romero, a Spanish seaman brought suit against a Span-
ish shipowner for injuries suffered aboard a Spanish-flag vessel
Look at Lauritzen v. Larsen, Choiceof Law and Forum Non Conveniens, 38 La. L. Rev. 957
(1978).
43. 345 U.S. at 588-91. This is not to suggest that they would not carry more weight in
other cases of general maritime tort, such as a seaman's claim for unseaworthiness. Romero
v. International Terminal Op. Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
44. Id. at 588-89.
45. Id. at 593. The Court merely reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for disposition consistent with the Court's findings. •
46. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); Gomez v. Karavias U.S.A. Inc., 401 F. Supp.
104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
47. See, De Mateos v. Texaco Pan., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1976) aff'd sub
nom. De Mateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978); see also Fisher v. Agios Nicholaos V, 628 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1980).
48. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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while in American waters. Romero differed from Lauritzen in three
distinct ways. First, the action in Romero was brought not only
under the Jones Act, but also under general maritime law - unsea-
worthiness and maintenance and cure. The Supreme Court held
that the Lauritzen test applied to the seaman's general maritime
claims as well as to his Jones Act claim because, "the similarity in
purpose and function of the Jones Act and the general maritime
principles of compensation for personal injury, admit of no rational
differentiation .... "4 Second, unlike the injury in Lauritzen, the
injury in Romero occurred in American waters. Third, in addition
to the Spanish shipowner, three American corporations, engaged in
stevedoring and related operations aboard the ship, were joined as
co-defendants in Romero. These facts prompted the Court in Ro-
mero to define the proper judicial recourse when choice-of-law
principles barred the application of a U.S. statute to a foreign sea-
man's claim.
The district court in Romero applied Lauritzen and dismissed
the seaman's Jones Act and general maritime claims against the
employer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court agreed with the lower court's application of the Lau-
ritzen test, barring recovery under the Jones Act °.5  The Court,
however, held that the district court erred in dismissing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the lower court did have
jurisdiction to determine whether the claim was cognizable under
the law. 51 The Supreme Court noted that if the lower court had
found Lauritzen to prohibit plaintiff's claim under the Jones Act,
then the proper procedure would have been to dismiss the case for
failure to state a legal claim.2
It has often been held that the federal courts have-jurisdiction
to hear general maritime claims by foreigners, but that they may
decline such jurisdiction at their discretion.5 3 This discretion to de-
cline jurisdiction is exercised under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.5 4 In effect, Romero broadened the choice-of-law test of
Lauritzen into one of forum non conveniens by incorporating the
discretionary jurisdiction notion of general maritime law.
49. Romero, 358 U.S. at 382.
50. Id. at 359.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 356-66 (1885); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S.,
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421 (1932).
54. See G. GIMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-19, at 52 (2d ed. 1975).
1985]
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It is also important to note the effect of the Romero decision
on the Lauritzen test. Dismissal for forum non conveniens is pre-
mised on the notion that plaintiff has access to an alternative fo-
rum, whereas dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not
predicated on the availability of another forum. It would be incon-
sistent for a court to dismiss a seaman's Jones Act claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction while only conditionally dismissing his
general maritime claim upon his submission to the jurisdiction of
another forum. Romero requires, therefore, the use of forum non
conveniens in both Jones Act and general maritime claims when
Lauritzen contacts enjoin recovery under American law. This hold-
ing is consistent with Lauritzen because it is patterned after Lau-
ritzen's sixth factor, the inaccessibility of a foreign forum.
III. Two INTERPRETATIONS OF LAURITZEN: THE LIBERAL AND
RESTRICTIVE VIEWS
Subsequent lower court interpretations of the Lauritzen test
evidence a split in application among the circuits. Some jurisdic-
tions have interpreted Lauritzen liberally, favoring the quality of
the contacts between foreign seamen and the American forum
rather than the quantity of such contacts. This view was supported
by the Supreme Court decision in Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis.55
Other jurisdictions have taken a restrictive view, favoring a policy
of comity with foreign sovereigns.
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc.5 6 was the first case
to construe the application of the Lauritzen test in a controversy
where individual factors yielded conflicting results. In Bartholo-
mew, a British West Indies seaman brought an action for Jones
Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure claims against a
Liberian vessel. The Liberian corporation that owned the vessel
was held by a larger Panamanian corporation, whose stock was
owned by U.S. citizens. In Bartholomew, the law of the flag sup-
ported the application of foreign law,57 while the allegiance or
domicile of the injured seaman5' and the allegiance of the defen-
dant shipowner supported jurisdiction under the Jones Act.59 The
55. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
56. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied., 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
57. Id. at 438.
58. The plaintiff was a citizen of the British West Indies but held to be a resident and
domiciliary of the United States for purposes of the Jones Act. Id. at 442.
59. Id. at 441-42.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted Lauritzen and
held that rather than consider and weigh factors that had no rela-
tionship to the United States, the court would look to those factors
that did implicate the United States, and would determine if they
were "substantial."60 This "substantial contacts" test stipulates
that Jones Act jurisdiction depends on the quality of the American
contacts. Therefore a lone contact could create Jones Act jurisdic-
tion if it were qualitatively substantial. The three factors held to
be most important in Lauritzen (law of the flag, allegiance or
domicile of the injured seaman, and the allegiance of the ship-
owner) have become the crucial contacts courts evaluate when ap-
plying the "substantial contacts" test.6 1 Hellenic Lines v.
Rhoditis, 2 is the most recent case decided by the Supreme Court
to have an effect on the Lauritzen choice-of-law test. In Rhoditis, a
Greek seaman filed suit against a Greek shipowner for injuries suf-
fered aboard a Greek-flag vessel while in the port of New Orle-
ans.63 The facts in Rhoditis are almost identical to those in Ro-
mero. If the Supreme Court had not expanded the Lauritzen test,
the case would have been dismissed as in Romero. In Rhoditis,
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated: "The Lauritzen
test. . .is not a mechanical one. . . .The significance of one or
more factors must be considered in light of the national interest
served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction. '64 The opinion
further stated that the objective was "to effectuate the liberal pur-
poses of the Jones Act" and, "the list of seven factors in Lauritzen
was not intended as exhaustive. . . .[T]he shipowner's base of op-
erations is another factor of importance in determining whether
the Jones Act is applicable; and there well may be others. ' 65 The
Rhoditis Court specifically adopted the Bartholomew "substantial
contacts" test. The Court liberally construed the test by holding
that if it could be shown that the shipowner's base of operations
was in the United States, he would be held accountable to the obli-
gations and responsibilities of a Jones Act employer even though
there were no recognized contacts with the United States.6
60. Id. at 441.
61. Dutta v. MN Clan Graham, 528 F.2d 1258 (4th cir. 1975).
62. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
63. Id. at 307-308.
64. Id. at 308-309.
65. Id. at 309.
66. Id. at 310. The shipowner, though a Greek citizen, had been a permanent resident
of the U.S. for 25 years and had managed the corporation out of offices in New York and
New Orleans. In addition, the entire income of the ship on which the plaintiff was injured
1985]
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The most important contribution Rhoditis provided to the
choice-of-law test was the addition of an eighth factor, the vessel's
base of operations. The base of a vessel's operations carries greater
weight than the locus of the injury or the forum of a vessel's flag in
determining what law to apply. This modern approach to the issue
closely parallels the "liberal" view of the Lauritzen test and the
doctrine chosen by the court in Sosa.
The restrictive view of the Lauritzen test was developed by
the dissent in Rhoditis. The dissent's argument was premised on
the contention that the underlying purpose behind Lauritzen was
to defer to the "relevant interests of foreign nations in the regula-
tion of maritime commerce. '67 Justice Harlan, writing for the dis-
sent, believed that the majority's holding would threaten the deli-
cate balance existing between the liberal reach of the Jones Act
and the doctrine of comity with the laws of foreign nations.6 s
The restrictive view reappeared in De Mateas v. Texaco Inc., 9
where Jones Act and general maritime claims were dismissed on
grounds of forum non conveniens. In De Mateas, the only contact
that existed with the United States was the ownership and man-
agement of the vessel by foreign subsidiaries of an American mul-
tinational oil corporation.70 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in rejecting the Second Circuit precedent and reverting to
the Lauritzen policy of deferring to the laws of foreign nations,
asserted that "[I]t would be an extreme suggestion. . . that Ameri-
can law could govern relations between [the Panamanian subsidi-
ary of an American corporation] and the employees in its Panama-
nian business enterprise incorporated in Delaware. '7 1
The De Mateas holding was subsequently affirmed and elabo-
rated upon in Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp. 2 In
Chirinos, four Venezuelan employees were killed while working on
a drilling rig in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela. As in prior cases, the
only contact with the United States was the fact the defendant was
a Delaware corporation owned by Exxon Corporation. Despite this
contact, and despite the fact that the defendant frequently collab-
was derived from voyages to or from American ports.
67. 398 U.S. at 312 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Romero v. International Terminal
Op. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959)).
68. Id. at 318.
69. 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
70. Id. at 898, 902.
71. Id. at 902.
72. 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980).
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orated with Exxon,7 3 the third circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime claims on
grounds of forum non conveniens. The court placed great weight
on the fact the injury occurred on Venezuelan inland waters. It
reasoned that defendant's business with Exxon was insufficient to
fall within the base of operations rule.74 The Chirinos court ap-
plied what amounted to a territorial rule. Rather than apply the
old standard of place of the wrong, the court looked to the location
of the base of operations relative to the venture. 5
While some courts have narrowly interpreted the Rhoditis78
holding, others have expanded the notion of base of operations.77
These courts have broadened the reach of American maritime law
by finding such a base of operations on a showing of fewer Ameri-
can connections than was shown in Rhoditis. A recent and contro-
versial decision using this reasoning was the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Fisher v. The Agios Nicolaas V.78 Like Rhoditis, Fisher involved
a suit brought by the personal representatives of a Greek seaman
to recover damages for fatal injuries received aboard a Greek-flag
vessel within United States territorial waters. Unlike Rhoditis, the
defendant corporation in Fisher was neither controlled by Ameri-
can stockholders, nor managed from American soil. In Fisher, the
court found that the vessel's entire business activity prior to the
accident had been in the United States, and that "its entire reve-
nues therefore to be earned"79 were derived from American trade.
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court finding that the defendant had an American base of opera-
tions justifying the application of American law. 0 This liberal ap-
plication of the base of operations test is the proper one for the
courts to follow. The remedies offered under American maritime
law are among the most powerful seamen's remedies found in any
jurisdiction. It is, therefore, more consistent and even-handed for
73. Id. at 1243.
74. Id. at 1247.
75. Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d (9th Cir. 1980) 82, 88; see also Chiri-
nos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 462 F. Supp. 782, 786 n.11 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980).
76. See Chirinos, 613 F.2d 1240.
77. See De Oliverira v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 684 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982); Chiazor
v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
78. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc denied, 636 F.2d 1107, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 816 (1981).
79. 628 F.2d at 317-18.
80. Id. at 317.
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U.S. courts to apply American law to all vessels that derive a bene-
fit from the use of American ports and territorial waters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sosa v. MIV Lago Izaba518 presents the most troublesome con-
troversy of maritime conflicts: cases involving injuries to foreign
seamen occurring within U.S. territorial waters, aboard foreign-flag
vessels not expressly owned by Americans, but, nevertheless, hav-
ing American bases of operations. It has been argued that the ap-
plication of the Jones Act and American general maritime law to
these cases is appropriate because it promotes the general deter-
rent and compensatory policies of the laws. The promotion of
safety in American waters and the regulation of the social and eco-
nomic loss from accidents within American waters can be effected
more efficiently and equitably if all distinctions between American
and foreign vessels, shipowners, or seamen are eliminated. The
outdated fiction of "the floating island"82 simply is not a reason to
shield foreign shipowners from responsibility for the losses they
cause. Nor is it a reason to treat foreign seamen less generously if
they are employed by foreign, rather than American shipowners.
Applying American law to these cases will also ensure that foreign
shipowners who engage in active trade to or from American ports
will not be at a competitive advantage vis-a-vis American shipown-
ers who have to operate under the significantly higher costs im-
posed by American law.
The current trend, which follows the "open door" left by
Rhoditis, is to apply the base of operations test when determining
whether to allow a cause of action under the Jones Act and Ameri-
can general maritime law. This trend follows the Supreme Court's
intent in Lauritzen not to create an all-inclusive list of determin-
ing factors. Even the restrictive view of Lauritzen accepts the base
of operations test as a proper yardstick for determining the appli-
cability of American law, and only differs from the liberal view in
the standard to be applied for satisfaction of the test. The Sosa
court endorsed the test when it looked through the "facade of for-
81. 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
82. The "floating island" concept was best described in United States v. Flore, 289 U.S.
137 (1933) where it was held that a merchant ship "is deemed to be a port of the territory of
that sovereignty [whose flag it flies], and not to lose that character when in navigable waters
within the territorial limits of another sovereignty." Id. at 155-59. From this arose the fic-
tion that a vessel was a floating part of the flagstate.
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eign incorporation"8 3 and found a shipowner who was benefiting
from substantial relations with the United States. Hence, the ship-
owner was charged by the court with the correlative responsibility
that the Supreme Court had previously determined such a benefi-
ciary will carry. The Sosa decision is therefore a prime example of
how U.S. courts are making it difficult for shipowners to hide be-
hind their foreign registry in an attempt to avoid the burden of the
powerful seaman's remedies available under American law.
KURT E. BOSSHARDT
83. Sosa, 736 F.2d at 1032.
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